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Abstract 
 
This paper investigates the influence of the staggered schedule of Italian mayoral 
elections and of the calendar of traditional religious celebrations (Patron Saint days) 
on the timing of fiscal decisions and on the selection of candidates. We find that 
potentially disruptive local income tax increases are more likely to be taken after 
local elections and Patron Saint Days. Moreover, when the elections take place 
during the weeks leading to Patron Saint day’s traditional celebrations, the elected 
mayors tend to exhibit milder ideology and higher indicators of valence, reinforcing 
the hypothesis that local folklore contributes to increasing the sense of community 
and lowering the ideological stakes of local races. 
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1. Introduction 
The idea that incumbent governments time their fiscal policies in order to 
signal their competence and boost their re-election chances (Rogoff and 
Sibert, 1988; Rogoff, 1990) has been an influential one in the political 
economy literature of the past decades. However, it is increasingly 
recognized that the incentives to produce a political budget cycle depend on 
circumstances (Shi and Svensson, 2006). In particular, recent literature 
suggests that social capital plays an important role in improving the quality 
of public policies through active participation and monitoring, strengthens 
the accountability of elected officials, and possibly weakens the incentives 
of budget manipulation (Boix and Posner, 1998; Knack, 2002; Atkinson and 
Fowler, 2014; Repetto, 2018). 
This paper aims at studying empirically within a unitary conceptual 
framework the consequences of the arrangement of the fundamental 
institutions of representative democracy (local elections) as well as of the 
calendar of social-capital-boosting recurrent events (annual traditional 
religious celebrations) on the scheduling of key municipal fiscal decisions 
by incumbent governments. In order to assess the impact of those potential 
shocks on the political cost of raising taxes, this paper uses for the first 
time a rich panel dataset of over 8,000 Italian municipalities during the 
years 2007-2015 containing detailed information on the timing (day of the 
year) of the fundamental fiscal policy decisions by incumbent mayors. 
First, we exploit the fact that Italian municipalities do not all vote in 
the same years due to an exogenous structure of staggered elections to 
identify the impact of the timing of municipal elections on the trajectory of 
a number of local budget variables (Alesina and Paradisi, 2017; Bonfatti 
and Forni, 2017; Repetto, 2018; Revelli, 2019). Second, since we know the 
exact day of the year when municipalities make their decisions on the local 
income tax rate – one of their main sources of revenues – we test if the 
timing of that crucial fiscal decision is affected by the exogenously set date 
of the election. Third, we study the role of social capital in fiscal policy-
making by exploiting the annual recurrence of traditional religious events 
(Patron Saint days). In particular, we investigate whether the timing of those 
celebrations, that can be interpreted as temporary boosts to the citizenry’s 
perception of the common values of the polity, has an influence on the 
timing of fiscal decisions. Finally, we investigate whether the concurrence 
of elections and Patron Saint day celebrations affects the process of 
selection of mayoral candidates. More specifically, the final contribution of 
the paper is to test the hypothesis that the increased sense of community 
that is observed in the proximity of traditional celebrations spills over onto 
concomitant mayoral elections, lowering the ideological content of mayoral 
races and inducing the electorate to switch from private value to common 
value voting. In the presence of a higher sense of common values, voters 
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would be more likely to cross ideological party lines and converge towards 
higher valence candidates. 
Our results can be briefly summarized as follows. First, our empirical 
analysis confirms the existing evidence of a political budget cycle 
characterized by pre-electoral fiscal expansion and post-electoral austerity. 
Using a novel panel dataset of yearly budget variables (2007-2015), we find 
that the indicators of fiscal effort fall before the elections and increase after 
them, while municipal budgets deteriorate before the elections to improve 
thereafter. Second, by exploiting the precise dates when municipal councils 
make their annual income surcharge rate-setting decisions, our empirical 
analysis provides original evidence that the probability to raise the local 
income tax rate is significantly higher during post-electoral than during pre-
electoral months. As regards the effect of Patron Saints’ days, it turns out 
that local income tax-setting decisions are more likely to be scheduled far 
from celebration periods. This novel evidence is compatible with the idea 
that those events provide temporary but sizeable shocks to the 
connectedness, participation, and trust within a community, inducing 
incumbents to schedule potentially disruptive fiscal decisions to less 
sensitive times. Finally, we explore the consequences of the timing of 
electoral and religious events on the selection of mayors: when elections 
happen to occur concomitantly with traditional religious celebrations, and 
particularly during the weeks preceding the Patron Saint day, the elected 
mayors of those localities tend to be characterized by milder ideological 
affiliation and higher indicators of valence. This result corroborates the 
hypothesis of a positive albeit temporary impact on the cohesion and 
common-value thinking of a community of the concurrence of sacred 
(Patron Saint day) and profane (election day) events. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 contains a 
literature review and discusses the possible mechanisms at work. Section 
3 illustrates the institutional background of the municipal level of 
government in Italy. Sections 4 studies the impact of the calendars of 
mayoral elections and of Patron Saint day’s celebrations on the timing of 
local fiscal decisions, while Section 5 examines their combined influence on 
the selection of mayors. Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. Existing empirical evidence on political budget cycles 
Most of the early empirical research on political budget cycles has made use 
of national or state/regional level data. Evidence of political budget cycles 
in the aggregate balance has been found in OECD economies (Alesina et al. 
1997), in larger samples including both developed and developing countries 
(Persson and Tabellini, 2002; Shi and Svensson, 2006), as well as in new 
democracies (Brender and Drazen, 2008). Khemani (2004) provides 
evidence that Indian states spend more on public investment before 
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elections while they cut current spending, leaving the overall balance 
unchanged. Using monthly regional fiscal instruments and regional 
governor elections in Russia, Akhmedov and Zhuravskaya (2004) find 
evidence of a significant budget cycle in public spending and its 
composition, and of the cycle decreasing with the level of democracy, 
transparency and media freedom. Kneebone and McKenzie (2001) use data 
on elections in Canadian provinces, and find that spending in highly visible 
areas (schools, roads and hockey rinks) tends to increase in election years. 
Galli and Rossi (2002) provide support of political cycles in health care, 
education and road construction spending in election years using German 
state data. 
In spite of long-standing difficulties in accessing reliable budgetary 
data at the sub-national level, the empirical literature on the existence of 
political budget cycle at the municipal level has been growing in the most 
recent years. Early work by Veiga and Veiga (2007) offered consistent 
evidence of a local political budget cycles in Portuguese municipalities. 
Foucault et al. (2008) show evidence of opportunistic behavior of local 
French municipalities, that raise all categories of public spending before the 
elections. Drazen and Eslava (2010) found evidence of a change in the 
composition of expenditures towards the most visible to voters before the 
elections using data on Colombian municipalities. Dahlberg and Mork 
(2011) analyze municipalities in Sweden and Finland and find election year 
effects in local public employment, in the sense that municipalities hire 
more full time employees in election years. Sakurai and Menezes-Filho 
(2011) use Brazilian municipal data to show evidence of an increase in total 
and current expenditures and a decrease in investments, local tax 
revenues, and budget surplus in election years. Foremny and Riedel (2014) 
use data on German municipalities and examine whether the timing of 
elections affects tax policy choices, finding evidence of a political cycle in 
terms of a cut of the local business tax rate prior to elections. Interestingly, 
Aidt and Mooney (2014) provide evidence that political budget cycles did not 
start in modern times using data on different suffrage regimes in London 
metropolitan boroughs before the Second World War. They find tax cuts and 
savings on administration costs in election years under a taxpayer suffrage 
regime, and an increase in capital spending under a universal suffrage 
regime. Finally, Klarin (2019) tests for the presence of election cycles within 
the budget composition in Swedish municipalities, finding that local 
governments increase expenditures that are visible to voters in election 
years. 
As far as Italian municipalities are concerned, Alesina and Paradisi 
(2017) show that incumbent mayors set lower real estate tax rates when 
close to elections, and Repetto (2018) reports evidence that the introduction 
of an obligation to disseminate financial information by Italian 
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municipalities had the effect of smoothing the electoral cycles in municipal 
investment spending. 
 
3. Institutional background 
The municipal level of government in Italy includes over 8,000 authorities. 
The average population size is of around 7,000 inhabitants, and the number 
of cities above 100,000 inhabitants is only around 40, just two of them 
exceeding one million residents, with more than half localities having less 
than 3,000 residents. Elections for municipal governments (local council 
and mayor) take place every five years, with direct election of the mayor in 
a single or dual ballot depending on resident population size. Localities with 
more than 15,000 inhabitants have a runoff stage among the two most 
voted candidates if none gets more than 50% of the votes in the first stage. 
Voters can express a vote for a mayor candidate as well as for a councilor 
candidate. Two thirds of the council seats are assigned to the councilor 
candidates that are typically grouped in a list supporting the mayor that is 
elected. Voting is formally mandatory for all aged above 18, though no 
sanctions exist for abstainers. The electoral schedule across the country is 
staggered, meaning that several elections occurred in each of the years that 
we consider here, as shown in Table 1. 
As a general rule, all municipal elections ought to be held 
simultaneously every five years to replace the mayor, the municipal 
government, and the council. The staggered timing of the elections is the 
product of events having occurred over the past 70 years. Indeed, despite 
almost all Italian municipalities voted for the first time in 1946 after the end 
of World War II and the restoration of democracy, in many of them the 
process of periodic renewal of the municipal councils did not follow the 
regular 5 years. Terms of office of various length can be due to a number of 
circumstances: break-up of the coalition supporting the mayor in the local 
council for political reasons; resign, death, or serious impediment of the 
mayor; merge of the municipality with other municipalities; corruption 
episodes, suspected mafia presence in the council, excessive budget 
deficits, or other violations of the law. All those circumstances force the 
municipality to early elections by decree of the Minister of Internal Affairs. 
The exact day of the election is chosen each year by decree of the Minister 
of Internal Affairs in the period 15 April to 15 June in case the mayor ends 
in the first semester of the year (or within the same time-span of the 
subsequent year in case the term of the mayor ends in the second semester 
of the year). The date has to be made public no later than 55 days from the 
day of the election, and there is no possibility of negotiation with the 
Ministry of Interior on this issue. The day of the elections does not depend 
on the area/region where the municipality is located. 
 
[Table 1 around here] 
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Municipal governments are in charge of a number of services 
including urban public transport, road maintenance and cleaning, waste 
collection and management, water and sewer services, environmental 
monitoring and protection, planning and zoning. Their own revenues are 
mainly constituted by a local property tax and a surcharge on the national 
personal income tax. The local property tax was introduced in 1993 
(Imposta Comunale sugli Immobili). At the time of its introduction, municipal 
governments could set a flat tax rate (between 0.4% and 0.7%) on the 
cadastral values of all properties situated within the municipal boundaries 
(domestic, commercial, industrial). The local government had the chance of 
granting partial tax base exemptions and rate reductions for properties 
devoted to particular uses (main residence or religious destinations). 
The municipal income surcharge was subsequently introduced 
nationwide in 1999 as a further step in the direction of granting local 
governments a wider degree of own fiscal autonomy and to reinforce the 
process of fiscal decentralization that started in 1993 with the introduction 
of the local property tax. The municipal income surcharge has since 
represented an important source of revenue for municipal governments, 
amounting to around 20-25% of total own tax revenues. Since the tax base 
is computed according to a comprehensive net ability to pay principle that 
includes income from all types of labor (employees, pensioners, self-
employed, and non-incorporated business alike) and capital (real and 
financial assets), the tax is due by the vast majority of residents and is 
therefore highly visible and salient. 
At the time of its introduction, the municipal income surcharge was 
restricted to be a flat rate on an identical tax base as the national personal 
income tax, with no low-income exemptions. The tax rate had to be set with 
a maximum of 0.5%, with year-to-year changes not exceeding 0.2%. 
Starting from 2006, the upper tax limit was lifted to 0.8% to allow local 
governments extra sources of autonomous revenue raising capacity during 
a period of state retrenchment and falling grants. Finally, in 2011 the 
national government made the local income surcharge more flexible by 
allowing municipalities to establish progressive local income surcharge 
schedules with rising income tax rates in accordance with nationally set 
income brackets. An increasing fraction of municipalities exploited this 
larger autonomy and moved from a proportional to a progressive local 
surcharge schedule over time, from around 14% in 2011 to 35% of them in 
2015. 
 We collected data on municipal elections held from 2007 to 2015 
from the Italian Ministry of Interior that manages and keeps detailed 
records of all municipal elections in general law Italian regions, or around 
90% of all local elections. Data on budget indicators of municipalities are 
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from the national statistical office (ISTAT). Municipal local income 
surcharge data as well as the dates when municipalities deliberate the 
surcharge are available from the Department of Finance of the Italian 
Ministry of Economy and Finance (http://www1.finanze.gov.it). Finally, to 
complete the dataset, we have collected information on the municipality 
Patron Saints Days from the Italian Municipality database 
(https://www.databasecomuni.it/). 
 
 
4. Empirical analysis 
 
4.1 Budget cycles 
First, we explore whether the exogenously fixed calendar of mayoral 
elections occurring every fifth year according to a staggered electoral 
schedule across the about 8,000 Italian municipalities has an influence on 
the trajectory of annual municipal budget data during the years 2007 to 
2015. We analyze the following municipal budget variables that might be 
manoeuvred strategically by incumbents (see Table 2 for descriptive 
statistics):  
 
1) Degree of financial autonomy, defined as the ratio of revenues from 
taxes, fees and charges over total revenues; 
2) Degree of taxation autonomy, defined as the ratio of tax revenues over 
total revenues; 
3) Budget surplus as a percentage of total revenues; 
 
 
 [Table 2 around here] 
 
In line with the political budget cycle theory, we expect those three 
budget indicators to fall as elections approach due to incumbents’ incentive 
to implement an expansionary fiscal policy of low fiscal effort and large 
public expenditures, and to recover after the elections. In particular, to 
recover the effects of the timing of mayoral elections on the trajectory of 
these municipal budget indicators, we estimate by OLS the following panel 
data equation after taking deviations from municipal means: 
 
𝑌𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛾𝑖 + 𝛿𝑡+ ∑ 𝛽𝑑
𝑑
𝐸𝑖,𝑡+𝑑
 
+ 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 (1) 
  
where 𝑌𝑖,𝑡 is the budget indicator in municipality 𝑖 and time 𝑡, 𝛾𝑖 is a time-
invariant municipality-specific effect reflecting the social and economic 
environment (e.g., the quality of institutions) in which elections take place 
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and is removed by de-meaning, 𝛿𝑡 is a year effect that is common to all 
localities, and 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 is an i.i.d. error term. 𝐸𝑖,𝑡+𝑑 is a dummy variable that 
equals 1 if an election is scheduled in municipality i at time t+d, with d = 
{+1, +2, +3, +4}. The vector of coefficients of interest from equation (1) is βd 
measuring the impact of the distance in years of a given year t from the year 
of the election on the budget variable Y. 
Figures 1 to 3 plot in a graph the estimated βd coefficients, along with 
their 95% confidence intervals, from equation (1) for the three budget 
indicators discussed above. The βd coefficients, summarized in Table A1 in 
Appendix A, are almost always estimated to be significantly different from 
zero, pointing to an impact of the timing of elections on budgetary indicators 
on top of the common macroeconomic effects that the empirical model 
controls for through the year dummies 𝛿𝑡. In addition, the graphs are 
generally compatible with the hypothesis of opportunistic incumbents’ 
behavior leading to an election-driven budget cycle. 
 
 [Figures 1-3 around here] 
 
The indices of revenue-raising effort of municipal governments such as 
financial autonomy (Figure 1) and taxation autonomy (Figure 2) fall before 
the elections and rise after the elections, peaking around the second year 
after the elections and declining thereafter. The budget surplus (Figure 3) 
improves after the elections and in the subsequent three periods, and 
deteriorates when the next election approaches. 
 
4.2 The timing of local income surcharge rate decisions 
While the evidence emerging from the previous section is suggestive of the 
existence of an election-driven budget cycle, the fact that municipal 
elections are usually held in late Spring or early Summer coupled with the 
use of annual budgetary data might mask the most interesting phenomena 
of opportunistic policy manipulation that take place within an election year. 
Ideally, one would like to observe how incumbent governments 
behave during the months, weeks, or maybe even the days immediately 
preceding and following an election. This is not possible in general due to 
the fact that budgets are made for the entire financial year that in most 
instances coincides with a calendar year. However, we are able to 
investigate this issue further because we know the exact day of the year 
when each local government calls a council meeting to make its annual 
decision about the local income tax. Every year, each government has to 
decide whether to make no changes with respect to the previous year’s tax 
rate, whether to introduce a positive income surcharge rate if they have 
never done so in the past, or whether to make changes to the existing rate. 
During the period we observe, most of the instances of changes to the local 
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tax rates implied rising average rates in response to state retrenchment and 
reductions in grants as well as to growing spending needs. 
In principle, each municipality can make its decision on its personal 
income tax rate any time of the year. The fact that the fiscal decision must 
be made every single year while elections take place once every five years in 
a staggered way makes it possible to identify the impact of the exogenous 
date of the elections on the timing of the fiscal decision by using 
municipalities not having elections in those years as controls. 
Consider first the distribution over the 365 days of a calendar year 
of the occurrences of the municipal decisions on the income tax rate for all 
authorities that faced an election during that year. Figure 4 reports the 
distribution of the timing of the municipal council meeting raising the 
income tax rate in terms of the distance (in days) from the day when the 
mayoral election within the same year takes place. Positive figures on the 
horizontal axis correspond to tax increases made after the election day, 
negative figures correspond to tax increases made before the day of the 
election, and zero corresponds to the instances where the decision to 
increase the local income tax was made the very same day of the mayoral 
election.  
 
[Figure 4 around here] 
 
First, Figure 4 clearly shows that tax rate increases tends to be 
clustered after the date of the election (to the right of zero). Tax rate 
increases are virtually absent in the couple of weeks immediately following 
the electoral week due to a physiological technical lag between the election 
and the official settlement of the new mayor and council. The peak of fiscal 
decisions tends to occur during the subsequent weeks. Finally, there are 
few sparse tax rate increase decisions during the weeks leading to the vote, 
but most authorities appear in general to procrastinate to the months 
following the election, with a second peak of fiscal decisions occurring 
around three to four months after the elections. 
A possible rationalization of the phenomenon emerging from Figure 
4 could be the combination of the facts that most authorities vote in late 
Spring/early Summer and of a physiological widespread behavior of 
municipalities due to recurrent nationwide holidays and established 
routines. To exclude such ‘seasonal’ explanation of the timing of fiscal 
decisions, Figure 5 shows the distribution of the timing of tax rate increases 
during the 365 days of the calendar year for municipalities not having 
election in that year (left figure) and for those having an election (right 
figure). 
 
[Figure 5 around here] 
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While Figure 5 points to some role of seasonality (virtually no fiscal 
decisions in January and August in either of the graphs), the difference 
between the patterns of behavior of authorities having or not having 
elections is impressive. In most cases, the latter make their fiscal decisions 
in the first half of the year, with peaks in late March and June, before the 
summer break. On the other hand, most authorities facing elections in that 
year – with elections typically occurring in late Spring/early Summer – 
postpone the fiscal decision to ‘safer’ times, towards late July or even Fall 
(mostly towards the end of September). 
We can indeed use the above information to estimate whether the 
probability of scheduling a municipal fiscal decision at a certain time of the 
year is affected by the exogenously determined dates of mayoral elections. 
We estimate the following equation, where for tractability we take the time-
unit of observation to be the week of the year when the fiscal decision in a 
given municipality is made:1 
 
𝐷𝑖,𝑤,𝑡 = 𝛾𝑖 + 𝜏𝑤 + 𝛿𝑡+ 𝜃𝑍𝑖,𝑤,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 (2) 
  
where, in the basic specification, 𝐷𝑖,𝑤,𝑡 is a binary variable taking the value 
1 in week w =1,…,52 if the municipal council of locality i makes a decision 
about the local income surcharge rate in that week of year t, and 0 
otherwise. A possible explanation for the postponement of the decision 
about the local income tax could be in terms of “political etiquette”, in the 
sense that incumbents might refrain from making important fiscal 
decisions in order to leave them to the newly elected government. Therefore, 
we also estimate equation (2) by letting the dependent variable equal 1 if 
the council decides to increase the municipal income tax rate, because this 
allows us in principle to better verify the hypothesis that mayors 
opportunistically postpone unpopular tax increases to after the elections. 
However, due to the complex and flexible structure of the Italian municipal 
income surcharge (with either flat or progressive rates, coupled with 
variously defined exemptions and no tax areas), tax increases or decreases 
cannot always be univocally identified. As an approximation, we label as tax 
increases all instances where a municipality raised its top marginal income 
tax rate from a year to the next.2 
As before, 𝛾𝑖 is a time-invariant municipality-specific effect, while 𝜏𝑤 
and 𝛿𝑡 are week and year effects, and 𝑍 is a ‘before-the-election’ dummy. In 
                                                          
1 Using daily data would imply managing a sparse dataset with over 25 million 
observations. 
2 While complex policy changes having heterogeneous impact on taxpayers do occur 
in the dataset, the cases of municipalities moving over time to schedules with lower 
statutory marginal tax rates are extremely rare. 
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particular, to test if the proximity of an election makes the fiscal decision 
more or less likely, we start by letting Z equal 1 in all calendar weeks that 
precede the day elections are held in a municipality, and subsequently 
experiment with shorter time spans (12, 8, and 4 weeks preceding the 
election week). Clearly, the binary indicator Z takes on value zero in all the 
weeks of the years where no election is scheduled. 
The estimation results of equation (2) are reported in Table 3. The left 
panel of the table considers all municipal decisions alike, while the right 
panel restricts the analysis to the instances where the municipal council 
actually made a decision to raise the top income tax rate. The estimation 
results in Table 3 are from Probit and Logit models in Columns A-E and B-
F respectively, while the estimation results of a linear probability model 
(LPM) are reported in Columns C and G. Finally, Columns D and H report 
estimates of the LPM after taking deviations from municipal means. 
 
[Table 3 around here] 
 
In all instances, the empirical evidence suggests that the timing of 
the elections plays a significant role in the scheduling of the tax rate-setting 
decision by incumbent mayors. The results are robust to the choice of the 
width of the before-the-election window, though the estimated coefficient 
appears to be increasing in absolute value with respect to the length of the 
before-election period that is considered. Both tax rate decisions in general 
and tax rate increases in particular are significantly more likely to be made 
after than before the elections, with the effect being stronger and more 
precisely estimated in the latter case. The probability of making a decision 
about the local income tax rate during the weeks preceding the election is 
lower by 0.10 to 0.20 percentage points relative to far-from-election weeks, 
while pre-election tax rate increases are less likely by 0.70 to 0.80 
percentage points. Given a baseline probability of making an increase in 
any given week of the year of around two percentage points (or 1/52), this 
implies that the probability of raising the local income tax rate during post-
election weeks is almost twice as large as during the weeks preceding the 
elections. 
 
4.3. Patron Saint days 
We turn now to testing the role of social capital in the timing of fiscal policy-
making. In particular, we aim at ascertaining if the decisions about the local 
income tax rate are more or less likely to be slated in the proximity of events 
– like traditional celebrations of Patron Saints – that can be believed to 
foster the degree of social participation, cohesion and connectedness of the 
polity. In fact, given that these widespread annual celebrations bring 
members of a community together by praying, singing, dancing, cooking, 
13 
 
and possibly discussing communal issues, they might have the effect of 
reinforcing peoples’ sense of community. 
In terms of the impact of the timing of these celebrations on local 
fiscal policy-making, one could expect, on the one hand, that any tax hike 
that is decided by the incumbent government under those circumstances 
will tend to have an amplified echo and could possibly generate a stronger 
than usual opposition. As a result, incumbents would program potentially 
disruptive local tax decisions to a different time of the year. On the other 
hand, it could be argued that citizens may have less time to monitor what 
local governments are actually doing because they are too involved in the 
preparation of the celebrations. In other words, there might be a ‘panem et 
circenses’ effect, with incumbents possibly trying to take advantage of the 
electorate’s distraction to enact the potentially most unpopular fiscal 
determinations around those times (Atkinson and Fowler, 2014). 
In order to explore this issue in further depth, we exploit the fact that 
Roman Catholic churches are widespread in Italy, and bear long-standing 
and deeply rooted traditions of veneration of thaumaturgic figures that are 
believed to protect local communities. Typically, each church, or even 
parish, has its own Patron Saint day, usually corresponding to the day of 
the year the saint died, often several centuries earlier. This implies that the 
particular time of the year local celebrations take place in a given 
community is virtually random, thus constituting the ideal circumstances 
of a natural experiment generating a temporary shock to a community’s 
social capital. 
Figure 6 shows the distribution of Patron saint days across the over 
8,000 Italian municipalities. Despite some clustering during the Summer, 
Patron Saint days are observed throughout the year. 
 
[Figure 6 around here] 
 
Figure 7 reports instead the frequency of municipal decisions on the 
local income tax rate increase in terms of the distance of the day the fiscal 
decision is made by the local council relative to the Patron Saint day. 
Clearly, 0 on the horizontal axis in Figure 7 corresponds to the 
circumstance where the decision on the local income tax rate exactly 
coincides with the day of the Patron saint day in that locality, while positive 
(negative) figures correspond to fiscal decisions made after (before) the 
Patron Saint day. 
 
[Figure 7 around here] 
 
No clear-cut pattern emerges from Figure 7, with tax rate changes 
being observed in large numbers both during the months preceding and 
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following the Patron Saint day. To shed more light on this issue, we estimate 
equation (3) below to find out if the probability of having a fiscal decision in 
a given week of the year is affected by the distance of that week from the 
Patron Saint celebration’s week:3 
 
𝐷𝑖,w,𝑡 = 𝛾𝑖 + 𝜏𝑤 + 𝛿𝑡+ λ𝑆𝑖,𝑤,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 (3) 
  
where 𝐷𝑖,𝑤,𝑡 is a binary variable taking the value 1 if the municipal council i 
raises its local income surcharge rate in week w=1,…,52  of year t. As before, 
𝛾𝑖 is a time-invariant municipality-specific effect, while 𝜏𝑤 and 𝛿𝑡 are week 
and year effects, and S is a ‘before-the-Patron-Saint-day’ dummy. In 
particular, we start by letting S equal 1 in all calendar weeks that precede 
the day the Patron Saint celebrations are held in a municipality (from the 
first week of January to the week just preceding the Patron saint day’s 
week), and subsequently experiment with shorter time spans (12, 8, and 4 
weeks preceding the Patron Saint day celebrations). 
The estimation results of equation (3) are reported in Table 4. As in 
Table 3, the left panel considers the timing of all municipal fiscal decisions, 
irrespective of whether the council decided to change the tax rate or not, 
while the right panel focuses on the instances where the municipal council 
actually decided to augment the income tax rate. Columns A-E and B-F 
report the estimation results of Probit and Logit models respectively, while 
Columns C-G and D-H show the estimation results of LPM with random or 
fixed municipal effects. 
The empirical evidence suggests that the decisions on the local 
income tax rate are more likely to be scheduled after the local Patron Saint 
celebrations, thus running against the hypothesis that politicians might try 
to take advantage of the distraction caused by the celebrations. The result 
holds in particular as far as tax rate increases are concerned, irrespectively 
of the time window that is considered, suggesting that the social capital 
accumulated during the religious event might contribute to make 
subsequent redistributive policies more acceptable. The probability of 
making a decision about the local income tax rate during the weeks 
preceding the local Patron Saint celebrations is lower by 0.04 to 0.05 
percentage points, while pre-celebration tax rate increases are less likely by 
0.10 to 0.20 percentage points. Given a baseline probability of 2% of making 
a tax increase in any given week, these estimates suggest that the likelihood 
of observing a local income tax rate increase is up to 10% higher after the 
local Patron Saint day than before it. 
 
                                                          
3 Again, for tractability, the time-unit of analysis is the week of the year the Patron 
Saint day in a given locality happens to fall into. 
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[Table 4 around here] 
 
Finally, Table 5 reports estimation results of an equation that has a 
binary indicator equaling 1 in week w of the year if a fiscal decision is made 
exactly in that week as dependent variable, and dummy variables indicating 
the distance from both the day of the election days and of the Patron Saint. 
 
[Table 5 around here] 
 
Tables 5 confirms the results obtained above, namely that tax rate 
changes are less likely to be observed either in the proximity of an elections 
or in concomitance with local traditional celebrations. In general, the effect 
of the timing of mayoral elections is estimated to be larger and more 
ubiquitous than the effect of the timing of the Patron Saint celebrations, 
that appears to be limited to tax rate changes taking place in the immediate 
vicinity of the feast.   
 
4.4. Concurrence of elections and Patron Saint days 
The empirical analysis proposed so far offers evidence in favor of the 
hypothesis that municipal governments are unwilling to make the crucial 
decision about the local income tax rate on the eve of an election or of a 
Patron Saint day celebration. One could wonder at this point whether and 
how the two sets of incentives might interact with one another, and if the 
presence of correlation between the timing of sacred and profane events 
could make separate identification of the two respective incentives 
problematic. In order to address this issue, first, we check whether and how 
Patron Saint Days correlate with election days by computing the coefficient 
of correlation between the ordinal number of the week of the year when a 
municipality holds a mayoral election and the ordinal number of the week 
of the year when it holds its Patron Saint Day celebration. The correlation 
coefficient takes a small and insignificant value of around +0.1, thus 
suggesting that separate identification of the timing of the two events on the 
timing of tax rate decisions does not pose serious problems from a purely 
econometric point of view. 
Second, in order to have an intuitive visual representation of the 
potential interaction between the dates of the elections and of the religious 
celebrations, Figure 8 plots the time pattern of municipal income tax 
increases relative to election days (Figure 4) conditional on the timing of 
Patron Saint Days relative to the timing of elections. Each of the four graphs 
in Figure 8 (A, B, C, D) distinctly displays the density of municipal income 
tax increases relative to the date of the election whether (right portion of 
each graph) or not (left portion of each graph) Patron Saint day celebrations 
occur concurrently with local elections. Concurrence of the two dates is 
allowed to go from an interval of four weeks (Figure 8, A) to an interval of 
sixteen weeks (Figure 8, D). The visual evidence from Figure 8 is pretty clear, 
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and supports the idea that the tax rate increase decisions tend to be 
clustered after the date of the election, irrespective of whether or not Patron 
Saint Day celebrations are held concomitantly. 
 
[Figure 8 around here] 
 
Finally, we estimate a more general specification of equation (3) that 
allows the probability of changing (raising) the tax in a certain week of the 
year to be affected by two dummy variables picking the distance of each 
calendar week from the week of the election and from the week of the Patron 
Saint day celebration, as well as by the interaction between those variables. 
Indeed, the presence of the interaction term allows the dependence of the 
probability of a fiscal decision on the distance from the day of the election 
(from the Patron Saint day) to be different in far-from-Patron-Saint-day (far-
from-elections) periods than in periods that are close. Since the probability 
of making a fiscal decision in a given week depends in turn on its expected 
marginal cost in terms of loss of popularity, the impact of the concomitance 
of those events on such costs depends on how it affects the sensitivity of 
voters to fiscal issues, and how such sensitivity translates into opposition 
to taxes. In fact, it seems unclear a priori whether one should expect the 
presence of one event to exacerbate or mitigate the impact of the other. 
Exacerbation would occur if positive shocks to social capital further raised 
voters’ ‘fiscal sensitivity’ (interpretable as a continuous variable) on top of 
what is produced by the coming election, and if the marginal cost of raising 
taxes were an increasing function of voters’ fiscal sensitivity. In those 
circumstances, the fact that the marginal cost of raising taxes before 
elections is higher than usual would induce incumbents to be even more 
cautious than they are in ordinary circumstances (a positive interaction 
effect). On the other hand, if the sensitivity of voters to taxes can be 
interpreted as a discrete ‘alert’ status that is switched on either by the 
election or by the Patron Saint day, the incentives generated by the two 
recurrences would substitute one for the other (a negative interaction 
effect). 
The results of estimation, summarized in Table 6, show that the two 
distance dummies have a highly significant independent impact on the 
timing of the fiscal decision4. However, no statistically significant influence 
emerges in general from their interaction, suggesting that incumbents 
behave in the same fiscally prudent way before an election (Patron Saint 
day) irrespective of whether the Patron Saint day (election) is approaching 
or is safely over.5 
                                                          
4 Due to the difficulty in interpreting marginal effects of interactions from non-linear 
models, Table 6 reports the estimates of linear models only. 
5 Further specifications of Models 2-4 that include an “After Patron Saint day” 
dummy and the associated interaction term return no additional statistically 
significant coefficient estimates. The results are available on request. 
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[Table 6 around here] 
 
 
5. Timing of elections, social capital and the selection of candidates 
The last part of the analysis turns to the investigation of whether the 
interaction of the calendars of mayoral elections and of Patron Saint day 
celebrations – calendars over which local authorities have no control – has 
an influence on the selection of mayors. Indeed, it can happen by pure 
chance that the date set for municipal elections by the Ministry of the 
Interior in a given year overlaps with the spell of religious celebrations for 
the local Saint in a number of municipalities. Patron Saint celebrations 
might increase the sense of community for several days or even weeks 
before and after the Patron Saint day.6 Neighborhood committees are 
involved in the organization, and public gatherings can be the occasion of 
discussing political and municipal administration issues. If traditional 
celebrations raise the popular sense of community, cohesion and 
responsibility for the public good, one could expect that holding mayoral 
elections in proximity of the Patron Saint day celebrations might lead to the 
selection of mayors that are significantly different from those that would be 
elected if the elections had been held at other times. 
 In fact, religious celebrations might influence the selection process of 
mayors by affecting both how people vote and whether they turn out to vote. 
If we consider social capital as “features of social organization, such as 
trust, norms, and networks, that can improve the efficiency of society by 
facilitating coordinated actions” (Putnam et al., 1993), then social capital 
could be a correct interpretation of what is happening in the days around 
the Patron Saint day celebrations. Therefore, community activities that 
increase trust and connectedness actually lead to collectively beneficial 
behavior and as a consequence improve the quality of democracy (for 
instance, through electoral participation and outcomes). When reviewing 
the communities which succeed in generating social capital, Putnam and 
Feldstein identify dinner parties, picnics, music, local art and dancing as 
important sources of community engagement and trust (Putnam and 
Feldstein, 2003). During Patron Saint day celebrations, citizens may 
become connected to one another by praying together, engaging in casual 
conversation, eating, drinking and having fun.  
A deeper sense of community may lead to higher voter turnout if the 
utility that citizens receive from performing their civic duties, especially if 
                                                          
6 Religious activities sometimes go along with folkloric representations and art and 
music performances for weeks, and often require a long preparation. Those events 
can involve carrying a statue of the saint in procession, historical reenactments, 
dancing, flag waving, singing and concluding with firework display. 
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in accordance with a social norm, is taken into account when making the 
decision to participate. Social pressure might play an important role as a 
voter mobiliser being an incentive to political participation (Gerber et al. 
2008; Nickerson, 2008). Social capital may reduce information costs about 
politics (Fiorina, 1990) as well as make people more careful about benefit to 
others (Fowler, 2006) increasing the likelihood to vote. On the other hand, 
a negative effect of social capital on turnout could be due to the fact that 
voters derive satisfaction from the act of voting (Riker and Ordeshook, 
1968), and a stronger sense of identity provides an alternative way of 
personal satisfaction to citizens. Community activities also tend to be highly 
time consuming (Rupasingha et al. 2006). As a consequence, rational 
individuals will have less time to form an opinion about the elections and 
to visit the polling places, thus reducing political participation (Atkinson 
and Fowler, 2014). 
Finally, within a theoretical framework where voting yields expressive 
benefits that are driven both by a position issue (ideology) and by a common 
value (valence of candidates), holding the elections in circumstances that 
represent  temporary boosts to a community’s social capital can tilt the 
selection mechanism in favor of the most valent candidates (Lo Prete and 
Revelli, 2017). The idea (formalized in Appendix B) is that voters receive 
signals before the election about the valence of candidates, and those 
signals may or may not match their ideological views. In the latter case, if 
the expressive benefit of voting by valence is larger than the expressive 
benefit of voting by ideology, they vote according to common values, thus 
accepting to cross party lines, and choose the candidate that the signal 
suggests to be the most valent. Consequently, holding the elections in 
circumstances (like Patron Saint day celebrations) that magnify the 
expressive benefit of voting based on the valence of candidate raises the 
share of individuals that go to the polls and vote according to the quality 
(competence or probity) of candidates, thus raising the chances that a 
valent candidate is elected. 
We estimate the effect of concurrence of election dates and Patron 
Saint day celebrations on voter turnout and on the characteristics of elected 
mayors through the following equation: 
 
𝜐𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛾𝑖 + 𝛿𝑡+φ𝑍𝑖,𝑡 +  𝜀𝑖,𝑡 (4) 
  
where 𝜐𝑖,𝑡 is either the voter turnout or the valence indicator of the mayor 
of municipality i elected at time t. 𝛾𝑖 is a time-invariant municipality-specific 
effect, 𝛿𝑡 is a year effect, and 𝑍𝑖,𝑡 is a dummy variable taking value 1 if a 
locality’s Patron Saint celebrations are held within two weeks before or after 
the date of the mayoral election. By doing so, we assume an increase in 
social capital at the municipality level in case the celebrations lie within a 
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four week window around the election date (for a similar approach, see 
Atkinson and Fowler, 2014).  
By estimating the model in equation (4) we are assuming that the 
before-election celebration and after-election celebration have the same 
effects. We relax this assumption by considering a model which estimates 
separate coefficients for the Patron Saint Day taking place before and after 
the election day through the following equation: 
 
𝜐𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛾𝑖 + 𝛿𝑡+φ𝑍𝑖,𝑡 + ϑ𝑊𝑖,𝑡 +  𝜀𝑖,𝑡 (5) 
 
where 𝜐𝑖,𝑡 is again either the voter turnout or the valence indicator of the 
mayor of municipality i elected at time t. 𝛾𝑖 is a time-invariant municipality-
specific effect, 𝛿𝑡 is a year effect,  𝑍𝑖,𝑡 is a dummy variable taking value 1 if 
a locality’s Patron Saint celebrations are held within two weeks before the 
date of the mayoral election while 𝑊𝑖,𝑡 is a dummy variable taking value 1 if 
a locality’s Patron Saint celebrations are held within two weeks after the 
date of the mayoral election7. Depending on the continuous or binary nature 
of the dependent variable, we estimate Equations (4)-(5) either using a 
standard linear panel data model or using a Probit regression approach that 
controls for random effects. 
 
5.1. Social capital and voter turnout 
We first explore whether the temporary shock to social capital due to the 
local celebrations affects voter turnout. To investigate whether political 
participation is affected by the concurrence of election and Patron Saint 
days, we use turnout rates at municipal levels as a measure of political 
participation using data recorded by the Italian Ministry of Interior 
(http://elezionistorico.interno.it). Voter turnout is defined as the ratio of 
votes cast to eligible voters, being bounded by definition between 0 and 
100%. Table 7 reports the average turnout rate in Italian municipalities. 
 
[Table 7 around here] 
 
The results summarized in Table 8 do not show any statistically 
significant effect on the rate of voter turnout of holding the election either 
within a uniform 4 weeks window (Table 8, Column A) or when allowing for 
different effects for holding the election 2 weeks before or after the Patron 
Saint day’s celebrations (Table 8, Column B), thus ruling out in this context 
the political displacement due to the religious involvement (“less-time-to-
                                                          
7 The few cases in which Patron Saint Day celebrations are held exactly in the day 
of the election have been included in the after-celebration dummy. 
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vote”) hypothesis.8 Moreover, the above results suggest that, if any, the 
impact of the concurrence of elections and local religious celebrations on 
the characteristics of elected mayors cannot be attributed to such 
concurrence bringing to the polls additional voters that would in ordinary 
circumstances have abstained. Admittedly, though, lacking information on 
the characteristics of the people that actually cast their votes in municipal 
elections, we cannot exclude that the concurrence of elections and local 
religious celebrations might alter the composition of the electorate that 
actually turns out to vote relative to the circumstances where the two events 
happen to be far apart, while leaving the overall rate of turnout unchanged. 
 
[Table 8 around here] 
 
 
5.2. Valence 
Conditional on turning out to vote, an increase in social capital exogenously 
determined by the concurrence of elections and religious events might 
cause a move from private value (ideological) voting to common value 
(valence) voting. The temporary boost in voters’ perception of the common 
good that is observed during elections that take place concurrently as local 
traditional celebrations might convince voters to forego their ideological 
affiliation and accept to cross party lines to converge towards higher valence 
candidates.9 
To proxy valence, we employ two traits of elected mayors (Table 7) 
that we take as proxies of their ‘competence’ (Italian Ministry of Interior, 
http://dait.interno.gov.it/): their level of education and their  professional 
status before entering politics.10  In particular, we use the available 
information on mayors’ education under the common assumption that 
holding a college degree tends to be viewed by voters as a signal of 
competence (Galasso and Nannicini, 2011). We build a dummy variable 
(Education) taking the value of 1 in case the elected mayor has a bachelor 
or further degree, and 0 otherwise. Furthermore, we use professional 
experience to build a measure of valence related to occupational status of 
the mayor. Indeed, professional records can provide useful information 
being a proxy of the level of knowledge required to perform specific tasks 
such as leading and managing public activities. Following the existing 
                                                          
8 Similar results emerge when using alternative time windows. 
9 Indeed, while we know the number of candidates and the rate of voter turnout for 
all elections, we can only observe a number of personal characteristics for those 
candidates who manage to become mayors. Therefore, we cannot answer the 
potentially interesting question of how concomitance of elections and traditional 
celebrations affects the characteristics of the pool of mayoral candidates. 
10 ‘Honesty’ is more difficult to proxy because episodes of corruption or other 
criminal records of candidates are not available. 
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literature (Bordignon et al. 2013; Revelli, 2016; Lo Prete and Revelli, 2017), 
we use the profession of the mayor before entering politics as a proxy for 
her administrative skills. More specifically, we build a dummy variable (High 
professional status) taking the value 1 in case the elected mayor was 
employed in a distinguished profession (architects, engineers, physicians, 
accountants, lawyers and academics).11 
Table 8, Columns C and E, shows that holding municipal elections 
within two weeks before or after the Patron Saint celebrations has a positive 
and statistically significant effect on the probability that highly educated 
and distinguished professional status candidates are elected. This result is 
compatible with the hypothesis that where social capital is higher due to 
social activities related to traditional celebrations, it is more likely to elect a 
competent candidate. When we allow the effects of concurrence of sacred 
and profane events to be different depending on whether the election takes 
place before or after the Patron Saint’s celebrations (Table 8, Columns D 
and F), we find that the positive impact on candidates’ valence is driven by 
those municipalities that hold elections during the two weeks leading to the 
Patron Saint day’s celebration. This result suggests that the shock to the 
connectedness and trust of the members of a community mostly works 
during the preparation of the celebrations, and it tends to fade after the 
celebrations are held. Finally, Columns G and H show the results of 
estimating the effect of the concomitance of electoral and religious dates on 
elected mayors’ win margins. The idea is that a higher win margin can be 
taken as an indirect piece of evidence of voters’ convergence towards valent 
candidates irrespective of ideological considerations (Revelli, 2016; Lo Prete 
and Revelli, 2017). The win margin is expressed as the logarithmic 
transformation of the absolute difference in votes between the top two 
candidates. While the win margin tends to increase somewhat in elections 
held shortly after the Patron saint day’s celebrations, the effect is only 
marginally statistically significant.12 
 
 
 
                                                          
11 We follow the classification by the Italian National Institute of Statistics (ISTAT) 
which identifies the level of competence needed to implement strategies at policy 
and institutional level such as those acquired by those working in the judicial 
system, universities, management of public and private companies. 
12 We also explored the possibility that the concurrence of elections and Saint day 
celebrations might affect political competition by broadening the number of 
candidates. The number of mayoral candidates in the 2007-2015 time span varies 
from a minimum of 1 to a maximum of 19 candidates. Races with two-digit 
candidates are very rare and occur only in very large cities. The estimation results 
do not show any significant effect of concomitance of electoral and religious events 
on the degree of competition for office, though (results available on request). 
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6. Conclusions 
Based on a rich panel dataset of Italian local elections, this paper has 
studied the influence of the exogenously fixed calendar of Italian mayoral 
elections as well as of the timing of local Patron Saint Day’s celebrations on 
the trajectory of a number of key municipal budget variables, on the timing 
of local income tax rate setting decisions and on the selection process of 
mayoral candidates. In order to separate common shocks to all 
municipalities from potential effects related to the electoral cycle, we take 
advantage of the staggered structure of local elections. Moreover, the use of 
within-country municipal level data makes it possible to keep cultural, 
institutional and economic aspects constant. 
The empirical results first confirm the existing evidence of a political 
budget cycle, with the revenue raising effort of municipal governments 
falling before the elections and rising thereafter. Second, when examining 
the specific timing of local income surcharge rate decisions, we find that the 
timing of elections plays an important role: potentially costly tax rate setting 
decisions are more likely to be taken after the election. Moreover, we find 
that those crucial tax rate decisions are more likely to be made far from the 
period when Patron Saint Day’s celebrations are held.  
Finally, to rule out that procrastination of fiscal choices to after the 
Patron Saint Day may be simply due to politicians taking time off from their 
duties close to the festivities, we test whether concurrence of sacred and 
profane events has an impact on the selection of politicians. In fact, if local 
celebrations simply interfered with ordinary administrative activity without 
having any profound impact on a community’s “social capital,” or more 
generally on its views about the local public good, then one should expect 
to see no consequence on the selection of mayors when elections occur 
during that particular time of the year. We find evidence that the 
concurrence of mayoral elections and Patron Saint Day’s celebrations 
affects the selection of mayor candidates too, particularly when the 
elections take place during the weeks leading to the Patron Saint day’s 
celebrations. The results are compatible with the hypothesis that the 
increased sense of community, participation and social capital that 
accompanies the preparation of the traditional celebrations tends to lower 
the ideological stakes of local elections, leading rational voters to cross party 
lines and converge towards the candidates that are characterized by higher 
indicators of valence. 
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TABLES 
 
Table 1 – Voter turnout in municipal elections 
Year Turnout Municipalities 
2007 73.57 833 
2008 78.88 455 
2009 76.94 4020 
2010 73.00 631 
2011 66.99 1259 
2012 62.70 836 
2013 67.54 524 
2014 71.31 3874 
2015 65.52 675 
Notes: Turnout rate= votes/electorate; includes all municipalities for which information on at least two 
elections is available. Source: Ministero dell’Interno, Municipal election data. 
 
 
 
 
Table 2 – Descriptive Statistics of municipal budget indicators (Mean Values) 
Year Degree of  
Financial Autonomy 
Degree of  
Taxation Autonomy 
Budget 
Surplus 
 Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. 
2007 0.390 0.160 0.407 0.162 0.161 0.243 
2008 0.368 0.148 0.368 0.148 0.150 0.325 
2009 0.378 0.151 0.371 0.144 0.150 0.232 
2010 0.382 0.153 0.376 0.146 0.150 0.239 
2011 0.552 0.210 0.588 0.223 0.152 0.240 
2012 0.596 0.211 0.620 0.211 0.151 0.259 
2013 0.557 0.180 0.594 0.171 0.178 0.254 
2014 0.606 0.209 0.649 0.181 0.251 0.317 
2015 0.548 0.213 0.642 0.177 0.373 0.488 
Notes: Source - Italian National Institute of Statistics (ISTAT) 
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Table 3 - Elections & timing of local income surcharge rate determination 
 PROBIT 
(dF/dx) 
LOGIT 
(dF/dx) 
LPM 
 
LPM 
(Fixed effects) 
 PROBIT 
(dF/dx) 
LOGIT 
(dF/dx) 
LPM FE 
(Fixed effects) 
          
 Local Income Surcharge Rate Decision  Local Income Surcharge Rate Increase 
    
 A B C D  E F G H 
          
 Model 1 
          
Before election -0.001*** 
(0.0003) 
-0.0008*** 
(0.0002) 
-0.001*** 
(0.0003) 
-0.001*** 
(0.0003) 
 -0.008*** 
(0.001) 
-0.008*** 
(0.001) 
-0.006*** 
(0.001) 
-0.008*** 
(0.001) 
          
 Model 2 
          
3 months before election -0.001*** 
(0.0003) 
-0.001*** 
(0.0003) 
-0.002*** 
(0.0004) 
-0.002*** 
(0.0004) 
 -0.007*** 
(0.001) 
-0.007*** 
(0.001) 
-0.007*** 
(0.001) 
-0.009*** 
(0.001) 
          
 Model 3 
2 months before election -0.001*** 
(0.0004) 
-0.001*** 
(0.0003) 
-0.003*** 
(0.0005) 
-0.003*** 
(0.0005) 
 -0.006*** 
(0.001) 
-0.005*** 
(0.001) 
-0.007*** 
(0.001) 
-0.008*** 
(0.001) 
          
 Model 4 
1 month before election -0.001*** 
(0.0006) 
-0.001*** 
(0.0005) 
-0.002*** 
(0.0007) 
-0.002*** 
(0.0007) 
 -0.005*** 
(0.002 
-0.005*** 
(0.001) 
-0.006*** 
(0.002) 
-0.006*** 
(0.002) 
          
Year dummies YES YES YES YES  YES YES YES YES 
Week dummies YES YES YES YES  YES YES YES YES 
Obs 2917863 2917863 2975076 2975076  342567 342567 392284 392284 
Notes: Weekly municipal-level data, 2007-2015. Dependent variable (Decision week) = 1 in week D=1,…,52 if the municipal council makes its decision on the local income 
surcharge rate in that week. Standard errors in parentheses. Before elections: dummy variable=1 in all calendar weeks before the week municipal elections are held. ***: p-
value<0.01; **: p-value<0.05; *: p-value<0.10. 
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Table 4 – Patron saint days & timing of local income surcharge rate determination 
 PROBIT 
(dF/dx) 
LOGIT 
(dF/dx) 
LPM LPM 
(Fixed effects) 
 PROBIT 
(dF/dx) 
LOGIT 
(dF/dx) 
LPM LPM 
(Fixed effects) 
          
 Local Income Surcharge Rate Decision  Local Income Surcharge Rate Increase 
    
 A B C D  E F G H 
          
 Model 1 
          
Before patron saint day -0.0003 
(0.0002) 
-0.0002 
(0.0002) 
-0.0002 
(0.0002) 
-0.0004 
(0.0003) 
 -0.0007 
(0.0005) 
-0.0005 
(0.0004) 
-0.001 
(0.0006) 
-0.001** 
(0.0009) 
          
 Model 2 
          
3 months before patron saint day -0.0004** 
(0.0002) 
-0.0003** 
(0.0002) 
-0.0005** 
(0.0002) 
-0.0005** 
(0.0002) 
 -0.001*** 
(0.0005) 
-0.001*** 
(0.0004) 
-0.001*** 
(0.0006) 
-0.001*** 
(0.0006) 
          
 Model 3 
2 months before patron saint day -0.0005** 
(0.0002) 
-0.0004** 
(0.0002) 
-0.0006** 
(0.0002) 
-0.0006** 
(0.0002) 
 -0.0009* 
(0.0005) 
-0.0008* 
(0.0004) 
-0.001** 
(0.0007) 
-0.001*** 
(0.0007) 
          
 Model 4 
1 month before patron saint day -0.0002 
(0.0003) 
-0.0002 
(0.0003) 
-0.0002 
(0.0003) 
-0.0002 
(0.0003) 
 -0.001* 
(0.0007) 
-0.001** 
(0.0006) 
-0.002** 
(0.0009) 
-0.002** 
(0.0009) 
          
Year dummies YES YES YES YES  YES YES YES YES 
Week dummies YES YES YES YES  YES YES YES YES 
Obs 2749869 2749869 2803788 2803788  323697 323697 333044 333044 
Notes: Weekly municipal-level data, 2007-2015. Dependent variable (Decision week) = 1 in week D=1,…,52 if the municipal council makes its decision on the local income 
surcharge rate in that week. Standard errors in parentheses. Before Patron Saint day: dummy variable=1 in all calendar weeks before the Patron Saint Day. ***: p-value<0.01; 
**: p-value<0.05; *: p-value<0.10. 
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Table 5 – Elections, Patron saint days & timing of local income surcharge rate determination 
 PROBIT 
(dF/dx) 
LOGIT 
(dF/dx) 
LPM LPM 
(Fixed effects) 
 PROBIT 
(dF/dx) 
LOGIT 
(dF/dx) 
LPM LPM 
(Fixed effects) 
          
 Local Income Surcharge Rate Decision  Local Income Surcharge Rate Increase 
    
 A B C D  E F G H 
          
 Model 1 
          
Before election day -0.001*** 
(0.0003) 
-0.0009*** 
(0.0002) 
-0.001*** 
(0.0004) 
-0.001*** 
(0.0004) 
 -0.008*** 
(0.001) 
-0.008*** 
(0.001) 
-0.006*** 
(0.001 
-0.008*** 
(0.001) 
Before patron saint day -0.0003 
(0.0021) 
-0.0002 
(0.0002) 
-0.0002 
(0.0002) 
-0.0004 
(0.0003) 
 -0.0007 
(0.0005) 
-0.0005 
(0.0004) 
-0.001 
(0.0006) 
-0.001** 
(0.0009) 
          
 Model 2 
          
3 months before election day -0.001*** 
(0.0003) 
-0.001*** 
(0.0003) 
-0.002*** 
(0.0004) 
-0.002*** 
(0.0004) 
 -0.007*** 
(0.001) 
-0.007*** 
(0.001) 
-0.007*** 
(0.001) 
-0.009*** 
(0.001) 
3 months before patron saint day -0.0004** 
(0.0002) 
-0.0003* 
(0.0002) 
-0.0005** 
(0.0002) 
-0.0005** 
(0.0002) 
 -0.001*** 
(0.0005) 
-0.001*** 
(0.0004) 
-0.001*** 
(0.0006) 
-0.001*** 
(0.0006) 
          
 Model 3 
  
2 months before election day -0.002*** 
(0.0004) 
-0.001*** 
(0.0003) 
-0.003*** 
(0.0005) 
-0.003*** 
(0.0005) 
 -0.005*** 
(0.001) 
-0.005*** 
(0.001) 
-0.007*** 
(0.001) 
-0.007*** 
(0.001) 
2 months before patron saint day -0.0005** 
(0.0002) 
-0.0004** 
(0.0002) 
-0.0006** 
(0.0002) 
-0.0006** 
(0.0002) 
 -0.0009* 
(0.0005) 
-0.0008* 
(0.0004) 
-0.001** 
(0.0007) 
-0.001** 
(0.0007) 
          
 Model 4 
          
1 month before election day -0.002*** 
(0.0006) 
-0.001*** 
(0.0005) 
-0.002*** 
(0.0007) 
-0.002*** 
(0.0007) 
 -0.005*** 
(0.002) 
-0.005*** 
(0.002) 
-0.006** 
(0.002) 
-0.006*** 
(0.002) 
1 month before patron saint day -0.0002 
(0.0003) 
-0.0002 
(0.0003) 
-0.0002 
(0.0003) 
-0.0002 
(0.0003) 
 -0.001* 
(0.0007) 
-0.001** 
(0.0006) 
-0.002** 
(0.0009) 
-0.002** 
(0.0009) 
          
Year dummies YES YES YES YES  YES YES YES YES 
Week dummies YES YES YES YES  YES YES YES YES 
Obs 2749869 2749869 2803788 2803788  323697 323697 330044 330044 
Notes: Weekly municipal-level data, 2007-2015. Dependent variable (Decision week) = 1 in week D=1,…,52 if the municipal council makes its decision on the local income 
surcharge rate in that week. Standard errors in parentheses. Before elections: dummy variable=1 in all calendar weeks before the week municipal elections are held. Before 
Patron Saint day: dummy variable=1 in all calendar weeks before the Patron Saint Day. All observations included. ***: p-value<0.01; **: p-value<0.05; *: p-value<0.10.  
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Table 6 – Elections, Patron saint days & timing of local income surcharge rate determination 
 LPM LPM 
(Fixed effects) 
 LPM LPM 
(Fixed effects) 
      
 Local Income Surcharge Rate Decision  Local Income Surcharge Rate Increase 
    
 A B  C D 
      
 Model 1 
      
Before election day -0.002*** 
(0.001) 
-0.002*** 
(0.001) 
 -0.009*** 
(0.003) 
-0.011*** 
(0.003) 
Before patron saint day -0.0003 
(0.0002) 
-0.0005 
(0.0003) 
 -0.001* 
(0.0007) 
-0.001** 
(0.0009) 
Before election day*Before patron saint day 
 
0.001 
(0.001) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
 0.003 
(0.003) 
0.003 
(0.003) 
      
 Model 2 
  
3 months before election day -0.002*** 
(0.0005) 
-0.002*** 
(0.0005) 
 -0.007*** 
(0.001) 
-0.009*** 
(0.001) 
3 months before patron saint day -0.0004** 
(0.0002) 
-0.0004** 
(0.0002) 
 -0.001*** 
(0.0006) 
-0.001*** 
(0.0006) 
3 months before election day*3 months before patron saint day -0.0008 
(0.0009) 
-0.0008 
(0.0009) 
 0.0007 
(0.003) 
0.0008 
(0.003) 
      
 Model 3 
      
2 months before election day -0.003*** 
(0.0006) 
-0.003*** 
(0.0006) 
 -0.007*** 
(0.001 
-0.008*** 
(0.001) 
2 months before patron saint day -0.0007*** 
(0.0002) 
-0.0007*** 
(0.0002) 
 -0.001** 
(0.0007) 
-0.001** 
(0.0007) 
2 months before election day*2 months before patron saint day 0.002** 
(0.001) 
0.002** 
(0.001) 
 0.004 
(0.004) 
-0.005 
(0.004) 
      
 Model 4 
      
1 month before election day -0.003*** 
(0.0007) 
-0.003*** 
(0.0007) 
 -0.006*** 
(0.002) 
-0.006*** 
(0.002) 
1 month before patron saint day -0.0003 
(0.0003) 
-0.0003 
(0.0003) 
 -0.002** 
(0.0009) 
-0.002** 
(0.0009) 
1 month before election day*1 month before patron saint day 0.003 
(0.002) 
0.003 
(0.002) 
 0.004 
(0.008) 
0.005 
(0.009) 
      
Year dummies YES YES  YES YES 
Week dummies YES YES  YES YES 
Obs 2803788 2803788  330044 330044 
Notes: Weekly municipal-level data, 2007-2015. Dependent variable (Decision week) = 1 in week D=1,…,52 if the municipal council makes its decision on the local income 
surcharge rate in that week. Standard errors in parentheses. Before elections: dummy variable=1 in all calendar weeks before the week municipal elections are held. Before 
Patron Saint day: dummy variable=1 in all calendar weeks before the Patron Saint Day. All observations included. ***: p-value<0.01; **: p-value<0.05; *: p-value<0.10.  
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Table 7 – Turnout and mayors’ characteristics (2007-2015) 
Variables Mean Std Dev Min Max Obs 
      
      
Turnout 
 
 
73.176 9.631 17.694 100 12852 
      
Education (Degree) 
 
 
0.444 0.496 0 1 12852 
 
      
High professional status 
 
 
0.219 0.413 0 1 12852 
      
Win margin 
 
807.579 3074.957 0 148383 12852 
     Source: Anagrafe Amministratori Locali. 
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Table 8 – Panel data estimation results on time of election, number of candidates, mayors’ characteristics and turnout 
 Turnout Education 
 (dF/dx) 
High Prof. Status 
(dF/dx) 
Win margin 
         
 A B C D E F G H 
         
Patron Saint Day (four weeks window) 0.176  0.038**  0.041***  0.099*  
 (0.215)  (0.019)  (0.015)  (0.053)  
Patron Saint Day (two weeks before)  0.438  0.029  0.029  0.139* 
  (0.283)  (0.027)  (0.022)  (0.075) 
Patron Saint Day (two weeks after)  -0.036  0.045**  0.050***  0.069 
  (0.261)  (0.024)  (0.019)  (0.067) 
Candidates 0.603*** 0.603***       
 (0.044) (0.044)       
Win margin -0.000*** -0.000***       
 (0.000) (0.000)       
Electorate (th) -0.000 -0.000 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000* 0.000* 0.000*** 0.000*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Age 25-24 (%) 16.004*** 16.066*** -0.004 -0.007 0.613** 0.610** -5.409*** -5.403*** 
 (4.138) (4.138) (0.358) (0.358) (0.292) (0.292) (0.987) (0.987) 
Age 35-44 (%) 19.975*** 20.007*** -2.030*** -2.032*** -1.866*** -1.869*** -2.290*** -2.280*** 
 (3.822) (3.822) (0.300) (0.300) (0.238) (0.238) (0.824) (0.824) 
Age 45-54 (%) -2.101 -2.073 -2.164*** -2.165*** -1.426*** -1.428*** -11.128*** -11.124*** 
 (3.835) (3.834) (0.321) (0.321) (0.260) (0.260) (0.871) (0.871) 
Age 55-64 (%) 1.070 1.082 -1.851*** -1.851*** -1.520*** -1.521*** -9.513*** -9.514*** 
 (3.304) (3.303) (0.266) (0.266) (0.214) (0.214) (0.728) (0.728) 
Age > 65 (%) 
-11.229*** 
-
11.190*** 
-1.131*** -1.132*** -0.654*** -0.656*** -6.740*** -6.735*** 
 (2.112) (2.112) (0.153) (0.153) (0.118) (0.118) (0.423) (0.423) 
         
Year & Municipality effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Obs 11701 11701 11706 11706 11087 11087 11689 11689 
Notes: Annual municipal-level data, 2007-2015. Standard errors in parentheses. ***: p-value<0.01; **: p-value<0.05; *: p-value<0.10. 
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FIGURES 
 
 
 
Figure 1  – Degree of Financial Autonomy (Estimated 𝛽𝑑 coefficients from equation 1)  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2  – Degree of Taxation Autonomy (Estimated 𝛽𝑑 coefficients from equation 1) 
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Figure 3  – Budget Surplus (Estimated 𝛽𝑑 coefficients from equation 1) 
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Figure 4 – Distribution of Local Income Surcharge Rate Increases with Respect to the 
Dates of the Elections 
 
Note: Positive figures on the horizontal axis correspond to tax increases made after the election day, negative figures correspond 
to tax increase made before the day of the election, and zero corresponds to the instances where the decision to increase the 
local income tax was made the very same day of the mayoral election. 
 
 
Figure 5 – Distribution of Local Income Surcharge Rate Increases and Local Elections 
 
Note: Distribution of the timing of tax rate increases during the 365 days of the calendar year for municipalities not having 
election in that year (left figure) and for those having an election (right figure). 
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Figure 6 – Distribution of Patron Saints Days 
 
 
 
Figure 7 – Distribution of Local Surcharge Income Rate Increases with Respect to Patron 
Saints Days 
 
Note: 0 on the horizontal axis corresponds to the circumstance where the decision on the local income tax rate exactly coincides 
with the day of the Patron saint day in that locality, while positive (negative) figures correspond to fiscal decisions made after 
(before) the Patron Saint day. 
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Figure 8 – Distribution of Local Income Surcharge Rate Increases with Respect to the Dates of the Elections and to the 
Concurrence of Patron Saints Days 
 
Note: Density of municipal income tax increases relative to the date of the election whether (right portion of each graph) or not (left portion of each graph) Patron Saint day celebrations 
occur concurrently with local elections. 
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Appendix A 
 
 
 
Table A1 - Estimated Coefficients on Distance from election Dummies:  
Municipal Budget Indicators 
 
 Fiscal 
Autonomy 
Taxation 
autonomy 
Budget 
surplus 
    
1 year after elections -0.011*** 
(0.001) 
-0.008*** 
(0.001) 
0.005** 
(0.002) 
    
2 years after elections 0.009*** 
(0.001) 
0.018*** 
(0.001) 
0.004* 
(0.002) 
    
3 years after elections 0.005*** 
(0.001) 
0.016*** 
(0.001) 
0.004* 
(0.002) 
    
4 years after elections -0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.0005 
(0.001) 
-0.009*** 
(0.002) 
    
Obs 37543 37543 37543 
 
Notes: Annual municipal-level data, 2007-2015. Estimated 𝛽𝑑 coefficients from equation (1). Standard errors 
in parentheses. ***: p-value<0.01; **: p-value<0.05; *: p-value<0.10. 
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Appendix B 
 
Timing of elections, social capital and the selection of candidates: the model 
 
In order to clarify the mechanism by which the timing of sacred events can transmit to 
the process of political selection, we briefly sketch here a theoretical model of expressive 
voting that relies on Lo Prete and Revelli (2017), and easily lends itself to the analysis of 
the impact of a temporary boost to social capital on the democratic process. The model 
has two candidates (labelled by l and r) running for mayoral office in city n (n = 1, …, N) 
in a ‘winner-takes-all’ race, where the winner sets the ideological policy 𝜋𝑥, with 𝑥 𝜖 {𝑙, 𝑟}. 
Voting is driven by the position issue motive 𝜋𝑥 – with x-type voters liking the policy of 
candidate x – and by a common value motive given by the valence of candidates in terms 
of imperfectly observed competence or probity. In particular, each voter j has a set of 
beliefs {𝜄𝑗, 𝜅𝑗}, with 𝜄𝑗 𝜖 {𝑙, 𝑟} being the ideological attachment to either of the candidates’ 
policies, and 𝜅𝑗 𝜖 {𝑙, 𝑟} being voter j’s belief about candidates’ valence. Assume that voter 
j receives a signal 𝜅𝑗 before the election about the valence of candidates, and that the 
signal may or may not match a voter’s ideology ιj. If the expressive benefit of voting by 
ideology is larger than the expressive benefit of voting by valence, a voter votes according 
to ιj. If the expressive benefit of voting by valence is larger than the expressive benefit of 
voting by ideology, he votes according to κj, thus accepting to ‘cross party lines’ and vote 
for the candidate that the signal suggests to be the most valent.  
Based on the comparison between the benefits and the costs of voting, the net 
benefit of turning out to vote (𝑒𝑗) is: 
 
𝑒𝑗 = {
[𝑖𝑗 + 𝑣𝑗  ] − 𝑐𝑗            𝑖𝑓     𝜄𝑗 = 𝜅𝑗
max{𝑖𝑗, 𝑣𝑗} − 𝑐𝑗        𝑖𝑓     𝜄𝑗 ≠ 𝜅𝑗
 (1) 
 
where i is the expressive benefit of voting by ideology, v is the expressive benefit of voting 
for the candidate that is believed to be valent, and c is the cost of voting. A voter turns 
out to vote (𝑡𝑗 = 1) if the net benefit is positive: 
 
𝑡𝑗 = 1(𝑒𝑗 > 0) (2) 
 
Clearly, voters are more likely to turn out if the valence signals match their 
ideological views (𝜄𝑗 = 𝜅𝑗). Let us assume that 𝑣𝑗 = 𝑉, with V a positive parameter, and 
that i is independently and uniformly distributed on [0, 𝐼 ], with 𝐼 > 𝑉, and cumulative 
distribution function  Φ =
𝑖
𝐼
. 
Figure 9 offers a graphical representation of the forces determining how people 
vote, and whether they turn out to vote. Voters are first ordered according to the 
relevance of the private value issue i to them, with Φ on the horizontal axis indexing 
voters’ cumulative distribution function. The fraction of voters Φ =
𝑉
𝐼
 in Figure 9 has 𝑖𝑗 <
𝑉 and votes according to the valence signal they receive, while the fraction 1 −
𝑉
𝐼
 has 𝑖𝑗 >
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𝑉, and votes ideologically. As for the turnout decision, voters for whom the valence signal 
matches their ideological views have total benefits from turning out to vote as given by 
the solid straight line m (i+𝑣) in Figure 9, while voters for whom valence signals clash 
with ideological views have benefits described by the solid piecewise linear curve nm 
(max{𝑖, 𝑣}). If the cost of voting is homogeneous across voters at 𝑐𝑗 = 𝑐 > 0, all voters for 
whom the benefits from voting (m or nm) exceed c will turn out, while the others will 
abstain. 
 
[Figure 9 around here] 
 
Consider now what are the consequences of holding the elections in 
circumstances (like Patron Saint day celebrations) that raise the expressive benefit of 
voting based on the valence of candidate (V). First, equations (1) and (2) and Figure 9 
suggest that, holding everything else constant, an exogenous increase in V raises the 
rate of turnout. In particular, if the cost of voting c exceeds V, a marginal increase in V 
raises the turnout rate of voters for whom the valence signal matches their ideological 
views, leaving the turnout rate of voters for whom the valence signal clashes with their 
ideology unchanged.13 Second, Figure 9 makes it clear that an exogenous increase in V 
raises the share of individuals that vote according to the valence of candidates (that is, 
it shifts the V/I threshold to the right), thus raising the chances that a valent candidate 
is elected. Consequently, both effects work in the direction of tilting the selection 
mechanism in favor of the most valent candidates. 
 
                                                          
13 Clearly, no effect on turnout should be expected if V already exceeds the cost of voting c. 
40 
 
 
 
Figure 9 – Ideology and valence in voting 
 
Note: Graphical representation of the forces determining how people vote, and whether they turn out to vote 
